Stiegler reading Derrida: the prosthesis of deconstruction in technics by Roberts, Ben
This is a pre-press version of:
Roberts, B., 2005. Stiegler Reading Derrida: The Prosthesis of Deconstruction in Technics. 
Postmodern Culture, 16(1). Available at: 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/v016/16.1roberts.html
DOI: 10.1353/pmc.2006.0009
 
Stiegler Reading Derrida: The Prosthesis of Deconstruction 
in Technics
Ben Roberts, University of Bradford
1 Between Derrida and Stiegler
In  his  massive  multi-volume  work  Technics  and  Time Bernard  Stiegler  explores  a  history  of 
technics  as  epiphylogenesis—the  preservation  in  technical  objects  of  epigenetic  experience. 
Epiphylogenesis  for  Stiegler  marks  a  break  with  genetic  evolution  (which  cannot  preserve  the 
lessons of experience), a break which also constitutes the “invention” of the human. As Stiegler 
puts it in the general introduction to Technics and Time: “As a‘process of exteriorisation,’ technics 
is the pursuit of life by means other than life.” (Technics and Time 17) 
Since the “human” is constituted through its exteriorisation into tools, its origin is neither 
biological (a particular arrangement of cells) nor transcendental (to be found in something like 
consciousness). The origin of the human as the prosthesis of the living is therefore fundamentally 
aporetic: one should speak, for Stiegler, of a non-origin or default of origin.1 Stiegler develops these 
arguments through a reading of Rousseau and Leroi-Gourhan, showing on the one hand how the the 
empirical approach of the palaeo-anthropologist cannot avoid the transcendental question of origin 
and, on the other, how Rousseau’s transcendental account of the question of origin inscribes inside 
its account, despite itself, the thought of the human as contingent or accidental (Technics and Time 
82-133). 
I will not expand on Stiegler’s reading of Leroi-Gourhan and Rousseau here. What I intend to 
discuss is rather the relationship between Stiegler’s work and that of Jacques Derrida. In particular 
we will examine Stiegler’s discussion of Derrida in the latter half of the ﬁrst volume of Technics  
and Time and then move on to discuss some other points from the interviews between the two men 
gathered in the Echographies collection. 
The context of Stiegler’s disagreement with Derrida in the ﬁrst volume of Technics and Time is 
the discussion in chapter 3 of the palaeo-anthropologist Leroi-Gourhan and the “invention of the 
human”. At the opening of the chapter Stiegler argues: 
We are considering a passage: a passage to what is called the human. Its “birth,” if there 
is one …To ask the question of the birth of the human is to pose the question of the 
“birth of death” or of the relation to death. But at stake here will be the attempt to think, 
instead of the birth of the human qua entity relating to its end, rather its invention or 
even its embryonic fabrication or conception, and to attempt this independently of all 
anthropologism …(Technics and Time 135)
1  On the aporia of the origin of the human in relation to the work of Leroi-Gourhan see particularly (Technics and 
Time 141–2). Stiegler develops the argument around the ‘default of origin’ (défaut d’origine) through a reading of 
the ‘fault’ of Epimetheus in Plato’s Protagoras, concluding ‘[humans] only occur through their being forgotten; they 
only appear in disappearing’ (Technics and Time 188). See also Bennington and Beardsworth’s exposition of this 
argument in Stiegler: (“Emergencies” 180–1); (“From a Genalogy of Matter to a Politics of Memory” 95n16).
Here then is the place of Leroi-Gourhan in Stiegler: the chance to understand the emergence of 
the human in a non-“anthropologistic” manner. The key to this approach is the role Leroi-Gourhan 
assigns to technics in the evolution of the human. For Leroi-Gourhan the evolution of the human—
unlike that of animals—is not only a question of the evolution of a biological entity but also, 
crucially for Stiegler, the evolution of technical objects (or “organised inorganic matter” as Stiegler 
has it). As a result of this, Leroi-Gourhan opens up the possibility of an understanding of the human 
which is no longer simply that of either a biological entity or a biological entity with some 
transcendental quality (consciousness, free will, etc.) added to it. Unfortunately, for Stiegler, Leroi-
Gourhan will not be quite able to deliver on the promise of a non-anthropologistic or non-
anthropocentric account of the human. For although Leroi-Gourhan has an account of the process of 
hominization as the exteriorisation of the human in its tools, he still requires what Stiegler calls the 
“artiﬁce of a second origin” in order to account for the passage from “technical” to “creative” 
consciousness. What lies behind this failure is an inability to understand that the origin of the 
human is not merely obscure but fundamentally aporetic. For the exteriorisation of the human into 
technics—writing, tools and so on—raises a fundamental aporia of origin: “The paradox is to have 
to speak of an exteriorization without a preceding interior: the interior is constituted in 
exteriorization” (Technics and Time 141). It is at this point, in order to elucidate this aporetic 
structure, that Stiegler calls on the Derridean term différance: 
The ambiguity of the invention of the human, that which holds together the who and the 
what, binding them while keeping them apart, is différance …Différance is neither the 
who nor the what, but their co-possibility, the movement of their mutual coming-to-be, 
of their coming into convention. The who is nothing without the what and conversely. 
Différance is below and beyond the who and the what; it poses them together, a 
composition engendering the illusion of an opposition. The passage is a mirage: the 
passage of the cortex into ﬂint, like a mirror proto-stage. (Technics and Time 141)
For Stiegler only différance as a structure of differing and deferral without origin can describe 
this aporetic relationship between the interior and exterior that is the “human”. Différance, here the 
co-possibility of the who and the what, is what makes possible the who and the what, “below and 
beyond” them as Stiegler puts it, and as such is what make possible the non-origin or what he calls 
here the “proto-mirage” of the human, that is “the passage of the cortex into ﬂint”. However, the 
status of this passage is what is problematic here and what is at stake in Stiegler’s dispute with 
Derrida. On the one hand, this emergence or passage is a “mirage”, “aporetic” or “paradoxical”. 
The tool, the “work in ﬂint” is no more an effect or product of the human being than the human is 
an effect or product of the appearance of ﬂint tools. On the other hand, something, however 
“aporetic” it may be, happens, “is accomplished” or commences, that is this “beginning of 
“exteriorization”’. Put otherwise: what happens, what is suspended inside these quotation marks 
may remain paradoxical or aporetic, but that it happens, that there is a “passage” is not in question. 
For Stiegler this passage is crucial because it marks the emergence of what Stiegler calls from the 
beginning of Technics and Time “organised inorganic matter”, “the prosthesis of the human” or 
what he will later call, in relation to the discussion of Husserl, “tertiary memory”. It is precisely this 
passage that, for Stiegler, is “remaining to be thought” in Derrida’s work. This point seems to be 
demonstrated most clearly for Stiegler in Derrida’s own reading of Leroi-Gourhan in the chapter of 
Of Grammatology entitled “Of Grammatology as a Positive Science” and in particular in the 
following passage, which, since it seems to mark such a crucial point of distinction between Stiegler 
and Derrida, we will quote here at length: 
Leroi-Gourhan no longer describes the unity of man and the human adventure thus by 
the simple possibility of the graphie in general; rather as a stage or an articulation in the 
history of life—of what I have called differance—as the history of the grammē. Instead 
of having recourse to the concepts that habitually serve to distinguish man from other 
living beings (instinct and intelligence, absence or presence of speech, of society, of 
economy, etc. etc.), the notion of program is invoked. It must of course be understood 
in the cybernetic sense, but cybernetics is itself intelligible only in terms of a history of 
the possibilities of the trace as the unity of a double movement of protention and 
retention. This movement goes far beyond the possibilities of “intentional 
consciousness.” It is an emergence that makes the grammē appear as such (that is to say 
according to a new structure of nonpresence) and undoubtably makes possible the 
emergence of systems of writing in the narrow sense. Since “genetic inscription” and 
the “short programmatic chains” regulating the behaviour of the amoeba or the annelid 
up to the passage beyond alphabetic writing to the orders of the logos and of a certain 
homo sapiens, the possibility of the grammē structures the movement of its history 
according to rigorously original levels, types and rhythms. But one cannot think them 
without the most general concept of the grammē. That is irreducible and impregnable. If 
the expression ventured by Leroi-Gourhan is accepted, one could speak of a “liberation 
of memory,” of an exteriorization always already begun but always larger than the trace 
which, beginning from the elementary programs of so-called “instinctive” behaviour up 
to the constitution of electronic card-indexes and reading machines, enlarges differance 
and the possibility of putting in reserve: it at once and in the same movement constitutes 
and effaces so-called conscious subjectivity, its logos and its theoretical attributes. (Of 
Grammatology 84)
Now, from Stiegler’s point of view, the important point here in Derrida’s reading of Leroi-
Gourhan is that the exteriorisation of the human into tools or graphical marks is only a stage in 
différance as the “history of life” in general. Thus Derrida emphasises here the continuity of the 
“notion of program” from “genetic inscription” up to and beyond alphabetic writing. The possibility 
of the grammē as program is prior to any particular type of program, be it genetic or nongenetic and 
even if one must pay attention in the history of the grammē to “rigorously original levels, types and 
rhythms” Derrida insists that “one cannot think them without the most general concept of the 
grammē. That is irreducible and impregnable”. Stiegler’s response to this seems to be as follows: 
Différance is the history of life in general, in which an articulation is produced, a stage 
of différance out of which emerges the possibility of making the grammē as such, that 
is, “consciousness,” appear. The task here will be to specify that stage …The passage 
from the genetic to the nongenetic is the appearance of a new type of grammē and/or 
program. If the issue is no longer that of founding anthropos in the pure origin of itself, 
the origin of its type must still be found. (Technics and Time 137–8)
Thus even if Derrida is right in thinking that the notion of program in Leroi-Gourhan challenges 
all the traditional distinctions that mark the difference and origin of the human, of anthropos, it is 
nonetheless the case that with the human we see the emergence of a new type of program, and that 
new type of program is exactly what Technics and Time, in its understanding of technics as the 
prosthesis of the human, is concerned with. For Stiegler it is crucial therefore to distinguish genetic 
evolution from the non-genetic evolution which he calls epiphylogenesis and which involves the 
evolution not of the biological entity which the human being is, but of its technical supports, in 
which the human’s epigenetic experience is preserved and accumulated. 
For Stiegler it is the signiﬁcance of epiphylogenesis, or the fact that Dasein “becomes singular in 
the history of the living”, that Derrida fails to think. This is not simply because différance, which 
Stiegler establishes, on the basis of the quote from Of Grammatology, as the “history of life in 
general” is not developed far enough to have an account of the speciﬁcity of epiphylogenesis which 
Stiegler is outlining, but also, curiously, because Derrida’s arguments about différance are in some 
sense inconsistent with themselves. After quoting at length the passage from the essay “Différance” 
on the temporal and spatial dimensions of the French verb différer, Stiegler comments as follows: 
All of this points primarily to life in general: there is time from the moment there is life, 
whereas Derrida also writes, just before the Leroi-Gourhan quotation [i.e., the passage 
from Of Grammatology we have cited above], that “the trace is the differance that opens 
appearing and the signiﬁcation (which articulates) the living onto the non-living in 
general, (which is) the origin of all repetition” …To articulate the living onto the 
nonliving, is that not already a gesture from after the rupture when you are already no 
longer in pure phusis? There is something of an indecision about différance: it is the 
history of life in general, but this history is (only) given (as) (dating from) after the 
rupture, whereas the rupture is, if not nothing, then at least much less than what the 
classic divide between humanity and animality signiﬁes. The whole problem is that of 
the economy of life in general, and the sense of death as the economy of life once the 
rupture has taken place: life is, after the rupture, the economy of death. The question of 
différance is death. (139, translation slightly modiﬁed)
In other words, it is incoherent for différance to constitute both “the history of life in general” 
and the speciﬁc stage in the history of life—which Stiegler associates with the invention of the 
human and technics as epiphylogenesis—when the living is articulated upon “the non-living in 
general”, i.e., inorganic organised matter. However, one might wonder if it is not because Stiegler is 
himself operating from within such a rigorous distinction between phusis and tekhnē that he is able 
to convince himself that it is only after the “rupture” of the technical that death is the economy of 
life. For Stiegler it is only after such a rupture, i.e., “the invention of the human”, that the trace 
articulates the living on the non-living in general. It is only after this point that the evolution of a 
particular living being (the human) becomes bound up with the evolution of something that is not 
living, that is, what Stiegler calls “inorganic organised matter”, in the form of tools, writing and so 
on. But there is no reason to suppose that Derrida is working with the same set of assumptions when 
he talks of the possibility of the grammē embracing not only alphabetic writing but also “genetic 
inscription”, indeed it seems to be clearly the case that Derrida is precisely challenging such a 
classical set of distinctions (which is indeed what they are, for the opposition between epigenesis 
and epiphylogenesis only reproduces in a different form the more traditional opposition between 
nature and culture). It would seem perfectly reasonable for Derrida to argue that the reason for 
regarding genetic inscription as a species of the grammē is precisely because genetics does indeed 
articulate the living upon the non-living in general: the DNA of a biological entity binds it to its 
non-living ancestors just as much as their written or technical legacy; genetic codes preserve the 
legacy of the nonliving in the living in a way which is analogous to (though obviously not the same 
as) alphabetic writing. Moreover it is not immediately obvious why genetic evolution should be 
regarded simply as an “economy of life”, when death and genetic non-survival is in part the 
criterion of selection: genetics, it might be argued, is equiprimordially an economy of life and an 
economy of death. It is only if one thinks, like Stiegler, that there is ﬁrst an economy of life, then a 
rupture that coincides with the arrival of the human, and that then, as he argues above, “life is, after 
the rupture, the economy of death” that one is forced to regard genetic inscription as in some way 
rigorously distinct from all later forms of—no doubt, “epiphylogenetic”—inscription. 
In part the problem here is Stiegler’s attachment to the category of “organised inorganic matter” 
and the assumption that the organic/inorganic distinction maps in a straightforward, unproblematic 
manner onto the distinction between living and nonliving that Derrida invokes with respect to the 
trace. In fact, Stiegler often takes inorganic (inorganique) and non-living (non-vivant) to be simply 
synonymous.2 In other words he reads the ‘non-living in general’ of the quote from Of 
Grammatology as solely consisting of in very speciﬁc form of non-living he associates with 
inorganic matter. Having construed Derrida’s thinking of the trace in this manner, Stiegler is then 
2  This can be seen in the following deﬁnition of the organised inorganic from the article “Leroi-Gourhan: 
l’inorganique organisé”: ‘…Leroi-Gourhan fournit les concepts fondamentaux, et à partir desquels il est possible de 
faire apparaître un troisième RÈGNE, à côté des deux règnes reconnus depuis longtemps des êtres inertes et des 
êtres organiques. Ce nouveau règne , qui a été ignoré aussi bien par la philosophie que par les sciences, c’est le 
règne de ce que j’appelle les êtres inorganiques (non-vivants) organisés (instrumentaux)”: (“Leroi-Gourhan: 
l’inorganique organisé” 188–9).
puzzled by the question of why Derrida isn’t more interested in the relationship between organic 
and inorganic matter (living and non-living) and more speciﬁcally why he isn’t more interested in 
the ‘rupture’ of the human which Stiegler understands, as we have seen, as the point at which the 
evolution of the living becomes bound up with a relation to the non-living in the form of tools. 
Stiegler therefore makes the mistake of assuming that the trace requires one to think of this new 
category of organised inorganic matter when in fact the trace challenges (without erasing) the very 
categorial distinctions Stiegler is relying on. Indeed precisely what makes the trace, or the idea of 
the grammē as program, radical is that it exists on either side of Stiegler’s imagined rupture and 
therefore challenges both the opposition between nature and culture and “the name of man”. As 
Richard Beardsworth comments: 
The risk Stiegler runs in differentiating the historical epochs of arche-writing, and in 
thinking them in terms of technical supplementarity, is precisely that of considering 
technicity in the exclusively exteriorized terms of technics which beﬁt the process of  
hominization …The major theses in Technics and Time according to which the technical 
object represents a third kind of being …, that hominization emerges through the 
technical suspension of genetic, and that, therefore, the human lives through means 
other than life …all such theses, while brilliantly articulated by Stiegler in their own 
terms, end up having the following somewhat ironic consequence: biological life prior 
to, or in its difference from anthropogenesis is removed from the structure of originary 
technicity; as a result biology is naturalised and the differentiation of technicity qua 
technics is only considered in its exteriorized form in relation to processes of 
hominization. (“Thinking technicity” 81)
Indeed it might seem here that it is not so much Derrida’s account of différance that is confused 
as Stiegler’s reading of it. This point can be illustrated by Stiegler’s reading of a different passage 
about différance, a passage this time drawn from the essay “Différance”: 
Thus one could consider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed 
and on which our discourse lives, not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see 
what indicates that each of the terms must appear as the différance of the other, as the 
other different and deferred in the economy of the same (the intelligible as differing-
deferring the sensible, as the sensible different and deferred; the concept as different and 
deferred, differing-deferring intuition; culture as nature different and deferred, differing-
deferring; all the others of physis–tekhnē, nomos, thesis, society, freedom, history, mind 
etc.—as physis different and deferred, or as physis differing and deferring. Physis in 
différance…). (Margins of Philosophy 17)
Having cited a section of this passage, Stiegler comments: “Now phusis as life was already 
différance. There is an indecision, a passage remaining to be thought” (Technics and Time 139). 
What he seems to mean by this is that différance cannot be simultaneously “the history of life in 
general” (the deﬁnition from Of Grammatology which Stiegler is taking here to be synonymous 
with “the history of phusis in general”)3 and the differing-deferring of phusis and tekhnē which 
Stiegler assumes can only be the case after the “rupture” of the technical. But it seems fairly clear 
from this passage that Derrida sees the thought of différance as that which ﬁrst of all challenges the 
philosophical opposition between phusis and tekhne, establishing them as “different and deferred in 
the economy of the same”. It is not surprising therefore that Derrida does not have an account of the 
invention of the human as a “rupture” in différance, because this rupture would seem to risk 
affirming on a different level the very philosophical oppositions that such a différance disrupts. For 
it is indeed difficult not to see in Stiegler’s opposition of phylogenesis and epiphylogenesis a 
reproduction of a most classical opposition between nature and culture, where the “nature” of 
3  See Geoffrey Bennington’s comments on the problematic nature of this equation of phusis and “life”: 
(“Emergencies” 189).
phylogenetic evolution, which can never preserve the experience of the individual entity, is opposed 
to the “culture” of epiphylogenetic evolution which would preserve such epigenetic experience in 
its exteriorized prostheses (tools, writing and so on).4 On this reading, Stiegler would add to this 
traditional division the twist that such a culture would no longer be understood as the product of the 
human but as that which invents the human in an exteriorisation of the organic living being into 
inorganic technical objects. 
Of course, Stiegler would certainly not agree with the suggestion that the 
phylogenesis/epiphylogenesis divide or “rupture” simply reproduces the opposition between nature 
and culture; such a resistance would probably centre around his linking the idea of epiphylogenesis 
to différance. For the role which différance seems to play in Stiegler’s theoretical setup—especially 
in the ﬁrst volume of Technics and Time—is to show that as soon as there is anything like 
epiphylogenesis—i.e., culture—there is a différance, that is, a differing deferral without origin, 
which means that one can no longer think the rupture of the technical as an origin, either an origin 
of the human or an origin of culture. It is exactly on this point, after all, that Stiegler sees himself as 
deviating from Rousseau and Leroi-Gourhan, who must both ultimately rely on the artiﬁce of a 
second origin or coup in order to explain the deviation from nature (Rousseau) or the arrival of 
“symbolic consciousness” (Leroi-Gourhan). Epiphylogenesis as différance, on the other hand, 
allows for a new non-anthropocentric concept of the human and of “culture”. Such a concept would 
displace the question of the origin of the human and of culture, whether that question is framed in 
transcendental or biological terms. Indeed this seems to be exactly how Stiegler understands 
Derrida’s own reading of Leroi-Gourhan, as is evident from this (as we shall see, rather imprecise) 
précis of the passage from Of Grammatology we previously cited: 
In other words, Leroi-Gourhan’s anthropology can be thought from within an 
essentially non-anthropocentric concept that does not take for granted the usual divides 
between animality and humanity. Derrida bases his own thought of différance as a 
general history of life, that is, as a general history of the grammē, on the concept of 
program insofar as it can be found on both sides of such divides. Since the grammē is 
older than the speciﬁcally human written forms, and because the letter is nothing 
without it, the conceptual unity that différance is contests the opposition animal/human 
and, in the same move, the opposition nature/culture. “Intentional consciousness” ﬁnds 
the origin of its possibility before the human; it is nothing but “the emergence that has 
the grammē appearing as such.” We are left with the question of determining what the  
conditions of such an emergence of the “grammē as such” are, and the consequences  
as to the general history of life and/or of the grammē. This will be our question. (137, 
Stiegler’s emphasis)
For many readers of Derrida, this must seem like a rather strange way of understanding 
différance. For it is not easy to understand how a Derridean understanding of différance would 
allow one to oppose a “non-anthropocentric concept of the human” to an anthropocentric one, or to 
contest the opposition of concepts such as nature and culture by referring them to the “conceptual 
unity” of différance. Such a reading seems problematic that Derrida says, both in the essay 
“Différance” and elsewhere, to the effect that différance is not a concept, “neither a word nor a 
concept”, a point that is repeated many times in the essay “Différance”.5 Moreover, such remarks 
are not mere qualiﬁcations, caveats or platitudes which Derrida attaches to an otherwise orthodox 
semantic exposition of what différance is: they are rather at the heart of his argument. Différance is 
4  It should be noted that this clean separation between phylogenetic and epiphylogenetic evolution is challenged for 
Stiegler by modern technology in the form of genetic manipulation: ‘Dès lors que la biologie molèculaire rend 
possible une manipulation du germen par l’intervention de la main, le programme reçoit une leçon de l’expérience. 
La loi même de la vie s’en trouve purement et simplement suspendue” (“Quand faire c’est dire: de la technique 
comme différance de toute frontière” 272). See also (La technique et le temps II 173–187). 
5  “…différance is literally neither a word nor a concept…”; “…différance is neither a word nor a concept…”; “…
différance, which is not a concept…”: (Margins of Philosophy 3,7,11).
not a concept because it is “the possibility of conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in 
general” and “as what makes possible the presentation of the being-present, it is never presented as 
such” (Margins of Philosophy 6,11). Deconstruction can therefore never proceed by opposing 
différance as a new concept to a series of old metaphysical concepts, for example, by opposing a 
“non-anthropocentric” concept of the human to an anthropocentric one. It is also for this reason, as 
Derrida also makes abundantly clear, that one can never simply think différance as naming some 
kind of conceptual unity which would be prior to all conceptual oppositions. Since that which 
makes conceptuality possible can never in itself be made present as a concept, it is in principle 
“unnameable” (and this is the sense of “différance” being “neither a word nor a concept): indeed the 
choice of the term différance is, as Derrida points out, only a strategic or provisional one, which, as 
he also points out, does not mean that a better term (for example, “technics”, or “epiphylogenesis”),
6 or a real name, is waiting in the wings.7 Far from a conceptual or nominal unity, Derrida’s choice 
of the neographism “différance” is motivated not by a desire to unite the two meanings of the verb 
différer but by that of maintaining it as being “immediately and irreducibly polesemic” (8). 
In this sense it might seem as if the problem with Stiegler’s argument of Technics and Time is, as 
Geoff Bennington has argued, is Stiegler’s desire to think technics in both quasi-transcendental and 
positivistic terms.8 In other words there is a question about the relationship between historical or 
theoretical understanding of technics and the argument that Stiegler also wants to advance about 
technics as a quasi-transcendental structure (what Bennington refers to as “originary technicity”). 
This problem concerning the relationship between positive knowledge about technology and the 
quasi-transcendental understanding of technics also seems to arise in the series of interviews 
between Stiegler and Derrida presented in Echographies: 
The origin of sense makes no sense. This is not a negative or nihilistic statement. That 
which bears intelligibility, that which increases intelligibility, is not intelligible—by 
deﬁnition, by virtue of its topological structure. From this standpoint, technics is not 
intelligible. This does not mean that it is a source of irrationality, that it is irrational or 
that it is obscure. It means that it does not belong, by deﬁnition, by virtue of its 
situation, to the ﬁeld of that which it makes possible. Hence a machine is, in essence, 
not intelligible. (Echographies of Television 108)
It is difficult not to read this as a direct challenge to the logic of Technics and Time. For what is 
Stiegler’s project here if it is not to make technics visible and intelligible? 
Stiegler responds to Derrida at this point, making it clear that he has not taken Derrida’s basic 
point on board “It [i.e., technics] constitutes sense if it participates in its construction …” (109) To 
which Derrida responds in turn, reiterating: 
Yes, but that which constitutes sense is senseless. This is a general structure. The origin 
of reason and of the history of reason is not rational. (109)
In his own reading of this interview—an interview which he admits he ﬁnds ‘disappointing’ 
since ‘Derrida’s responses to [Stiegler’s] questions and interventions remain too much within the 
6  Geoff Bennington criticises Stiegler for his “conﬁdent identiﬁcation of ‘technics’ as the name for a problem which 
he also recognizes goes far beyond any traditional determination of that concept” (“Emergencies” 190).
7  “‘Older” than Being itself, such a différance has no name in our language. But we “already know” that if it is 
unnameable, it is not provisionally so, not because our language has not yet found or received this name, or because 
we would have to seek it in another language, outside the ﬁnite system of our own. It is rather because there is no 
name for it at all, not even the name of essence or of Being, not even that of “différance,” which is not a name, 
which is not a pure nominal unity, and unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of differing and deferring 
substitutions.”: (Margins of Philosophy 26).
8  “[Stiegler’s] compelling, and at times brilliant account of originary technicity is presented in tandem with a set of 
claims about technics and even techno-science as though all these claims happened at the same level. This 
mechanism makes of Stiegler’s book perhaps the most reﬁned example to date of the confusion of the quasi-
transcendental (originary technicity) and transcendental contraband (technics)”: (“Emergencies” 190)
ambit and terms of his own philosophy’ (“Towards a Critical Culture of the Image” 116)—Richard 
Beardsworth formulates the following reading of this exchange between Stiegler and Derrida: 
Derrida’s comments are, to say the least, odd in response to Stiegler’s concerns, both at 
a juncture of the interview when the two men are acquainted with each other’s 
preoccupations and, more importantly, at a moment in cultural history when the terms 
of philosophical reﬂection upon the real are shifting. As we have seen, Stiegler’s 
interest lies, precisely, in the historical differentiation of this “other” of reason and 
meaning together with the political implications of the articulation of this “other.” To 
respond by reiterating a series of propositions that are well-known from within and 
around the thought of deconstruction and post-structuralism, but that do not engage as 
such with the explicit wish on Stiegler’s part to genealogize, after the last twenty years 
thinking, what lies prior to the opposition between reason and unreason, meaning and 
unmeaning is intellectually and culturally dissatisfying. (“Towards a Critical Culture of 
the Image” 138)
But it is not surely not Derrida here who is failing to engage with Stiegler but vice versa: as we 
have seen above, Stiegler fails to respond to the basic problem being outlined here, however many 
ways Derrida formulates it, which one might formulate again and put as follows: ‘How is 
theoretical and historical knowledge of “technics” possible, given that as you yourself argue, 
technics is ﬁrst of all what makes theory and history possible?’ Stiegler never really responds to this 
question, neither in Echographies nor in the two ﬁrst volumes of La technique et le temps. In his 
General Introduction to the multi-volume work, he doesn’t even offer the genealogical explanation 
that Richard Beardsworth provides for him in his reading of Echographies. Moreover this response, 
i.e. to assert the possibility of a genealogy of technics, couldn’t be more problematic. One can 
provide a genealogy of a concept, showing how that concept is inherited through a determinate 
history. But we are concerned here with the genealogy of that which makes conceptualisation  
possible. Moreover—and here, in a sense, is the very strangest aspect of the deployment of the term 
“genealogy” here—as Stiegler has already shown us, technics as epiphylogenesis or tertiary 
memory is the condition of inheritance itself. A genealogy of technics would be a genealogy of  
genealogy itself , an exercise that would seem rendered impossible by the “topological” structure 
that Derrida has just mentioned in relation to intelligibility. 
Following the “topological” logic that Derrida has just outlined, if technics is the condition of 
memory it can’t possibly be made present, rendered intelligible, dissected, theorised, historicised 
and, in general, remembered or made present to consciousness. The tendency of Stiegler’s account 
is to make it seem as if technics is not only the condition of knowledge, but is in itself knowable. 
However, as soon as the prosthesis or technicity in general is the condition of knowledge, of what is 
sayable or thinkable, what can be positively known or said about the prosthesis qua prosthesis is 
necessarily limited. At a later point in the interview Derrida reformulates this idea in the terms of 
Specters of Marx on the relationship to inheritance. Derrida comments on the necessary 
dissymmetry which inhabits this relation to the spectral quality of the technical object: 
One has a tendency to treat what we’ve been talking about here under the names of 
image, teletechnology, television screen, archive, as if all these things were on display: 
a collection of objects, things we see, spectacles in front of us, devices we might use, 
much as we might use a “teleprompter” we had ourselves written or prescribed. But 
wherever there are these specters, we are being watched, we sense or think we are being 
watched. This dissymmetry complicates everything. The law, the injunction, the order, 
the performative wins out over the theoretical, the constative, knowledge, calculation 
and the programmable. (122)
For both Stiegler and Derrida the question of technics is closely linked to the question of 
inheritance: for Stiegler, as we have seen, it is because the technical object is the condition of my 
access to the “past I have not lived” that technics is constitutive of temporality; for Derrida, “to be 
is to inherit”, that is, to be is to be inhabited by a certain spectral inheritance. However, for Derrida 
what is crucial about the structure of inheritance is what he calls in Specters of Marx the “visor 
effect”9—the reference here being to the suit of armour worn by Hamlet’s ghost—which means that 
we cannot see the specter, even as “we sense or think we are being watched”. As Derrida reaffirms 
in Echographies: “The specter is not simply the visible invisible that I can see, it is someone who 
watches or concerns me without any possible reciprocity, and who therefore makes the law when I 
am blind, blind by situation” (121). Thus even if “to be is to inherit”, there is a certain impossibility 
about knowing the terms of that inheritance. What this seems to mean in this context of Derrida’s 
discussion with Stiegler, and this is the sense of the passage we have just cited, is that if technicity 
is the condition of inheritance, such a technicity can’t in itself become the object of a theoretical 
knowledge. The dissymmetry which Derrida remarks here is clearly linked to the topological 
structure we have just seen him bring out in relation to intelligibility: that which bears the 
inheritance can’t in itself become visible within that inheritance. Thus whereas in Technics and 
Time Stiegler could be seen constructing a (highly cogent) theory of inheritance as epiphylogenesis, 
for Derrida the structure of inheritance exceeds and makes possible theoretical knowledge, without 
itself becoming the object of a theoretical knowledge. It is in this sense that “[t]he law, the 
injunction, the order, the performative wins out over the theoretical, the constative, knowledge, 
calculation and the programmable”. 
It is in a sense the question of dissymmetry of this topological structure that would differentiate 
Stiegler’s theoretical account of technics from the thought of arche-writing in Of Grammatology. 
For Technics and Time never really explicitly poses the question of how the theory of technics or a 
history of the supplement is possible, or, put differently, how, given a general structure in which 
everyone has forgotten Epimetheus, it is possible for Stiegler to remember him. Stiegler’s work 
therefore inclines towards a much simpler and more traditional type of theoretical work in which 
one imagines that what can supersede philosophy in its repression of technics (or even Heideggerian 
thinking) is just a “better” theory,10 one which in this case makes possible a new thinking about the 
political or what Stiegler calls a “politics of memory”, as he outlines towards the end of the ﬁrst 
volume of Technics and Time: 
The irreducible relation of the who to the what is nothing but the expression of 
retentional ﬁnitude (that of its memory. Today memory is the object of an industrial 
exploitation that is also a war of speed: from the computer to program industries in 
general, via the cognitive sciences, the technics of virtual reality and telepresence 
together with the biotechnologies …There is therefore a pressing need for a politics of 
memory. This politics would be nothing but a thinking of technics …) (Technics and 
Time 276)
It might well seem therefore that Stiegler’s desire in the ﬁrst volume of Technics and Time to 
think technics on the basis of differance (and therefore to resist the various pitfalls which he ﬁnds in 
Leroi-Gourhan and Simondon) is at odds both with the speciﬁcs of Derrida’s own account of 
différance—this much is clear from the reading in The Fault of Epimetheus— but also with 
deconstruction in general to the extent that Stiegler in Technics and Time seems to be concerned 
with the construction of a new theoretical account of technics that is capable of simply displacing 
philosophical and, to a certain extent, traditional scientiﬁc accounts. At the stage of the “Fault of 
9  “To feel ourselves seen by a look that it will always be impossible to cross, that is the visor effect on the basis of 
which we inherit from the law”: (Specters of Marx 7, his emphasis).
10  This is essentially the argument that Geoffrey Bennington makes in his reading of Stiegler: “‘Technics’ is a 
philosophical concept, and to that extent can never provide the means to criticise philosophy. Failing to register this 
point (which is now very familiar as the principle of all of Derrida’s analyses of the human sciences in Writing and 
Difference and Margins) condemns one to a certain positivism, itself grounded in the mechanism of transcendental 
contraband whereby the term supposed to do the critical work on philosophy (here tekhnē) is simply elevated into a 
transcendental explanatory position whence it is supposed to criticise philosophy, while all the time exploiting 
without knowing it a philosophical structure par excellence’ (“Emergencies” 184). 
Epimetheus” it seems as if Stiegler is tending towards a theory of what one might call, using 
Richard Beardsworth’s terminology, ‘technics as time’.11 This theory would draw on deconstruction 
in a rather straightforward way—in effect as a continuation of the arguments that Derrida opens up 
in the chapter entitled “Of Grammatology as a Positive Science’ in Of Grammatology—whilst 
correcting, for example, Derrida’s failure to understand the signiﬁcance of the emergence of the 
human (which we addressed above). 
In later work12 Stiegler seems to want to advance a subtle distinction between his work and that 
of Derrida. This difference is articulated by arguing that whereas Derrida is primarily concerned (in 
Of Grammatology) with a ‘logic’ of the supplement he is concerned with the ‘history’ of the 
supplement. This distinction can be observed in the paper Stiegler, “Discrétiser le temps” where 
Stiegler argues for a history of the supplement “of which …Derrida has unfortunately never really 
explored the conditions”13. Even if Stiegler believes, as he states in the introduction to volume two 
of La technique et le temps (“La désorientation”) that the logic of the supplement is “always 
already” the history of the supplement,14 it is clear that he believes that Derrida has in some sense 
neglected this history of the supplement or failed to recognize its importance. One place in which 
this question is explicitly raised in La technique et le temps is in the discussion of phonetic writing 
in the chapter in volume 2 entitled “L’époque orthographique”: 
The stakes here concern the speciﬁcity of linear writing in the history of arche-writing, 
ortho-graphic writing which is also phono-logic, always understood from the beginning 
as such, and of which Derrida often seems to blur, if not deny the speciﬁcity of in the 
history of the trace.15
Immediately we notice here Stiegler’s insistence on the term “orthographic” writing in 
preference to “phonetic” or “phonologic”. Stiegler argues, via a reading of Jean Bottero, that what is 
distinctively different about such writing is not that it is closer to the sounds of speech, but rather 
that it is capable of breaking with the context of its inscription in a way that “pictographic” signs are 
not: 
“Proper writing” (l’écriture proprement dite) is what is readable as a result of us having 
at our disposal the recording “code”. It is orthothetic recording. Pictographic tables 
remain unreadable for us even when we have the code at our disposal: one must also 
have knowledge of the context. Without this, the signiﬁcation escapes. In order to 
accede fully to the signiﬁcation of a pictographic inscription, one must have lived the 
event of which it holds the record.16
Therefore for Stiegler the speciﬁcity of orthographic writing is not that it is closer to speech but 
that it represents a different type of ‘recording’ (enregistrement). Derrida’s own account of 
“phonologocentrism” seeks to show that (i) the philosophical account of language always prefers 
11  I am drawing here on Richard Beardsworth’s account of Stiegler’s work: “La technique et le temps therefore thinks 
technics ﬁrstly within time (in terms of its own historical dynamic), secondly with time (in terms of the impossibility 
of the origin), and thirdly as time (as the impure, retrospective constitution of the apophantic ‘as such’, or 
consciousness)” (“From a Genalogy of Matter to a Politics of Memory” 96).
12  For example in Stiegler, “Derrida and technology”.
13  ‘Histoire [du supplément] dont je pense que Derrida n’a malheureusement jamais réellement exploré les conditions 
…’: (“Discrétiser le temps” 117n6)
14  (La technique et le temps II 12)
15  L’enjeu porte sur la spéciﬁcité de l’écriture linéaire dans l’histoire de l’archi-écriture, écriture ortho-graphique qui 
est aussi phono-logique, toujours comprise d’abord comme telle, et dont Derrida parâit souvent éstomper, sinon 
dénier, la spéciﬁcité dans l’histoire de la trace.”: (La technique et le temps II 41).
16  “L’écriture proprement dite est ce qui nous est lisible pourvu que nous disposions du code d’enregistrement. C’est 
l’enregistrement orthothétique. Les tablettes pictographiques nous restent illisibles même lorsque nous disposons du 
code: il faut avoir aussi conaissance du contexte. Sans lui, la signiﬁcation échappe. Pour accéder pleinement à la 
signiﬁcation d’une inscripiton pictographique, il faut avoir vécu l’évenement dont elle tient registre.”: (La technique  
et le temps II 68–9).
speech to writing ; (ii) it therefore prefers phonetic writing to any other kind since, being closest to 
speech, it is something like the ‘least worse’ form of writing. The deconstruction of such 
phonologocentrism involves showing, on the one hand, how the characteristics that philosophy 
ascribes to writing are always already at work in language in general (including speech). To this 
extent Stiegler is quite happy to go along with Derrida’s account. He ﬁnds a problem when, on the 
other hand, Derrida argues that as soon as one removes the phonetic privilege, an axiomatic 
distinction between phonetic or orthographic writing and non-phonetic writing becomes impossible 
to sustain. Stiegler will therefore ﬁnd it problematic that Derrida can on the one hand argue in the 
opening Exergue of Of Grammatology that the phoneticization of writing is ‘the historical origin 
and structural possibility of philosophy as of science’ and yet on the other hand talk in a later 
chapter, ‘Of Grammatology as a Positive Science’ that ‘phoneticization …has always already 
begun’ and that ‘[the] cuneiform, for example, is at the same time ideogrammatic and phonetic’ (Of 
Grammatology 4,89). Stiegler comments: 
Grammatology elaborates a logic of the supplement where the accidentality of the 
supplementary is originary. It is concerned with taking the history of the supplement as 
accidental history from which would result a becoming essential of the accident—but 
one must therefore also talk of a becoming accidental of the essence. By most often 
blurring the speciﬁcity of phonologic writing, by suggesting for the most part that 
nearly all that develops therein was already there before, by therefore not making this 
speciﬁcity a central question (and doesn’t all grammatology come in a certain manner 
necessarily to relegate such a question?) doesn’t one weaken in advance the 
grammatological project?17
One has to understand this move in the context of Stiegler’s overall project in Technics and 
Time. The deconstruction of speech and writing is crucial to Stiegler’s argument in the sense that it 
appears to show that the technical supplement (writing), far from being an exterior accident that 
befalls an originally full speech, is actually at the heart of language proper. It therefore deconstructs 
the opposition between the contingent, ‘accidental’ exteriority of the technical supplement and 
language as essence or necessity. But for Stiegler this move is, as it were, only a ﬁrst step. What is 
required is that one goes beyond what he sees as a mere logic of the supplement— the 
deconstructive move that locates the contingent accidentality of the supplement within and not 
outside the essence of language—to what he wants to think of as the “history of the supplement”. 
The point is that Derrida’s deconstructive move here ought to lead him not only to the 
deconstruction of the relationship between the accidental and the essential but also to be more 
interested in the “accidental” in itself, in the history of the technical supplement, i.e. technics. It 
ought to lead him to thinking, as Stiegler puts it here, the “becoming accidental of the essence”, 
which involves rethinking the essence of the human as technical accidentality—essentially 
Stiegler’s project in Technics and Time. One ought to be less interested in the written supplement in 
general as an avenue for the deconstruction of then metaphysics of presence and more interested in 
the “speciﬁcity” of given written supplements. 
2 Beardsworth’s Two ‘Derrideanisms’
In the conclusion to his inﬂuential  1996 book,  Derrida and the Political,  Richard Beardsworth 
17  “La grammatologie élabore une logique du supplément où l’accidentalité supplémentaire est originaire. Il s’agit de 
prendre l’histoire du supplément en considération comme histoire accidentelle gauche dont résulterait un devenir-
essential de l’accident — mais il faudrait alors parler aussi d’un devenir accidentelle de l’essence. En estompant le 
plus souvent la spéciﬁcité de l’écriture phonologique, en suggérant que la plupart du temps presque tout ce qui s’y 
développe était déjà là avant, en ne faisant donc pas de cette spéciﬁcité une question centrale (et toute la 
grammatologie n’en vient-elle pas d’une certaine manière nécessairement à reléguer une telle question?), n’affaiblit-
on pas par avance le projet grammatologique?”: (La technique et le temps II 43)
develops  the  following  ‘loose  speculation’  which  charts  ‘two  possible  futures  of  Derrida’s 
philosophy’: 
The ﬁrst would be what one may call within classical concepts of the political a ‘left-
wing’ ‘Derrideanism’. It would foreground Derrida’s analysis of originary technicity, 
‘avoiding’ the risk of freezing quasi-transcendental logic by developing the trace in 
terms of the mediations between human and the technical (the very process of 
hominization). In order to think future ‘spectralization’ and establish a dialogue between 
philosophy, the human sciences, the arts and the technosciences, this future of Derrida’s 
philosophy would return to the earlier texts of Derrida which read metaphysical logic in 
terms of the disavowal of technē.
The second could be called, similarly, a ‘right-wing’ ‘Derrideanism’. It would pursue 
Derrida’s untying of the aporia of time from both logic and technics, maintaining that 
even if there is only access to time through technics, what must be thought, articulated 
and witnessed is the passage of time. To do so, this Derrideanism would mobilize 
religious discourse and prioritize, for example, the radically ‘passive’ nature of the arts, 
following up on more recent work of Derrida on the absolute originarity of the promise 
and of his reorganization of religious discourse to think and describe it (Derrida and the 
Political 156).
Even if immediately after this passage Beardsworth makes clear that there is in fact ‘no answer 
and no choice’ between these opposed ‘futures’ of what he calls here ‘Derrideanism’,18 it is clear 
from the rest of this concluding chapter to Derrida and the Political that the speculative choice he 
presents here is not merely a rhetorical device; it responds to or formulates what seems to be for 
Beardsworth a real duality in Derrida’s thought. Indeed even if Beardsworth retreats rather quickly 
from the reality of this choice, the terms in which he formulates it already seem to demand at least 
two questions, or sets of questions: ﬁrstly about the possibility of making a distinction between, on 
the one hand, a thinking of deconstruction in terms of technics (which Beardsworth associates here, 
as elsewhere, with the work of Stiegler) and, on the other, a sort of literary or ‘religious’ 
deconstruction; secondly, about the legitimacy of ascribing to these two, as it were, ‘schools’, a 
right- or a left-wing political orientation. Moreover while Beardsworth seems to retreat from the 
‘choice’ at the end of Derrida and the Political, in his later article ‘Thinking Technicity’ he offers a 
rather similar analysis of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ deconstruction. In this essay the ﬁrst (good) form of 
deconstruction is to be tied to Derrida’s early work and is again concerned with thinking, via the 
analysis of arche-writing, an originary technicity as the ‘radical exteriority of any interiority’ 
18  Bennington cites this passage from Beardsworth and then comments: ‘Beardsworth’s gesture in proposing this 
scenario only immediately to refuse it really might be described by the operator of disavowal’ (“Emergencies” 
214n47). Bennington is alluding here to Beardsworth’s frequent usage of the term disavowal to describe gestures of 
philosophical exclusion. (To take a few examples from an extremely rich ﬁeld: in Chapter 2 ‘[in] Hegelian logic, the 
very logic of contradiction ends up also disavowing time’ (Derrida and the Political 91); in Chapter 3, ‘Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Aristotle with respect to an opposition between vulgar and primordial time is …itself a disavowal 
of time’ (109); in the conclusion Beardsworth wonders ‘…does Derrida’s thinking of the “there” in terms of the 
promise disavow in turn the originary relation between the human and the nonhuman?’ (152). In general in 
Beardsworth one either ‘articulates’ or ‘negotiates’, on the one hand, or ‘disavows’ on the other.) Bennington 
comments of this ‘operator of disavowal’ in Beardsworth’s book: ‘Beardsworth’s understanding is that Derrida takes 
“metaphysics” to be to do with a “disavowal” of time …he uses the term within mild scare-quotes at ﬁrst, but soon 
stops and never thinks through the difficult implications there may be in relying on a psychoanalytically determined 
concept to describe this situation’ (“Emergencies” 197). It should be pointed out, however, that Beardsworth does 
offer the following (albeit short) justiﬁcation in a footnote to his introduction: ‘[I use] “Disavows” in the Freudian 
sense, that is in the sense of a refusal to perceive a fact which impinges from the outside. Freud’s example in his use 
of the term is the denial of a woman’s absence of penis …The term is, however, appropriate for the way in which 
the tradition of philosophy has “denied” ﬁnitude. The concept will be used frequently in my argument’ (Derrida and 
the Political 158n2).
(“Thinking technicity” 77). The second form of deconstruction is to be found, for Beardsworth, in 
Derrida’s work around ‘Levinasian ethics, negative theology and the Platonic conception of the 
khôra and is formulated here as thinking ‘an “excess” that precedes and conditions all 
determinations’ (ibid.). Beardsworth comments as follows: 
For Derrida, arche-writing and this excess of determination are necessarily the same, 
even though each reveals a series of singular traits particular to the context from which 
they are thought. I would nevertheless argue at this juncture that, despite their sameness 
they necessarily have different effects. These effects reveal that there is a tension 
between them, one which concerns the kind of work that they bring about on 
metaphysical thinking, and its limits. The one (that of excess) has arrested within the 
culture of contemporary philosophy further articulation of what lies behind the 
institution of metaphysical thought, while the other, if situated beyond the immediate 
question of language and writing, can be considered to invite further differentiations. 
The one has given rise to the ‘theological’ turn to deconstruction in the 1980s (together 
with the sense of its apolitical nature) while the other, if articulated through its 
differentiations, allows us to continue thinking the past and future of metaphysics in 
terms of technical supplementarity, one that allows us to advance all the more 
interestingly the political dimension of contemporary thought (“Thinking technicity” 
78).
The two forms of deconstruction that Beardsworth talks of here in ‘Thinking Technicity’ don’t 
seem in principle very different from the ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ Derrideanisms that 
Beardsworth has talked of earlier and here the ‘choice’ between them is not immediately withdrawn 
but rather conﬁdently affirmed. Indeed the opposition here between thinking technical 
supplementarity and thinking the ‘excess’ beyond all determination therefore reﬁgures here the two 
forms of alterity that Beardsworth outlines in the conclusion of Derrida and the Political: the two 
forms of radical alterity: 
There are …‘two’ instances of ‘radical alterity’ here which need articulation and whose 
relation demands to be developed: the radical alterity of the promise and the radical 
alterity of the other prior to the ego of which one modality (and increasingly so in the 
coming years) is the technical other. (Derrida and the Political 155)
Beardsworth goes on to argue that Derrida has indeed hitherto failed to ‘articulate’ these two 
forms of alterity; his failure to do so is explicitly tied here to his avoidance of the question of 
technicity in Derrida’s reading of Heidegger in Of Spirit. Derrida’s failure to articulate these two 
forms of alterity thus leads Beardsworth to imagine the two future forms of Derrideanism we have 
just mentioned. 
At this point it seems to be worth explicating a little further these two forms of alterity. The ﬁrst 
form of alterity—what I will call here ‘technical alterity’—is formulated here by Beardsworth in 
terms of a relation to the ‘nonhumanity’ of matter. This alterity is tied by Beardsworth to Derrida’s 
early thinking around arche-writing and the question of originary technicity. This technical alterity 
or originary technicity is then developed, as we have seen, by Stiegler into a theory of technics. 
Technics understands originary technicity as an ‘Epimethean’ prosthesis of the human, where the 
human is ﬁgured through the ‘default of origin’, constituted only in its prosthesis. It should be 
pointed out here that it is perhaps not entirely clear that Stiegler’s thinking of technics as the 
prosthesis of the human is entirely consistent with a thought of technical alterity or originary 
technicity. Indeed although in both Derrida and the Political and ‘From a Genealogy of Matter to a 
Politics of Memory’ Beardsworth seems fairly clear that Stiegler’s thinking of technics is consistent 
with the idea of articulating the relation to the ‘nonhuman’ of matter (or technical alterity), in his 
later article he seems to take some distance from Stiegler: 
The risk Stiegler runs in differentiating the historical epochs of arche-writing, and in 
thinking them in terms of technical supplementarity, is precisely that of considering 
technicity in the exclusively exteriorized terms of technics which beﬁt the process of  
hominization. In other words, the wish to differentiate further what lies behind 
metaphysics in terms of technics, if the model of technics remains that of the ‘technical 
object’, always runs the risk of re-anthropologizing the very thing that one wishes to 
dehumanise. The major theses in Technics and Time …while brilliantly articulated by 
Stiegler in their own terms, end up having the following somewhat ironic consequence: 
biological life prior to, or in its difference from anthropogenesis is removed from the 
structure of originary technicity; as a result biology is naturalized and the differentiation 
of technicity qua technics is only considered in its exteriorized form in relation to the 
process of hominization. (“Thinking technicity” 81)
In a sense this argument underlines the problematic nature of Stiegler’s reading of Derrida. For 
Stiegler, as we have seen, it is only with the human that life is pursued by means other than life. 
Hence the human marks a break in the history of différance as the history of life. The origin of 
technics as organised inorganic matter therefore constitutes the aporetic non-origin of the human. 
But, as Beardsworth points out here, this leaves the relationship between organic life and inorganic 
life undisturbed and ends up, in a certain sense, reaffirming the singularity of the human (as that 
which is invented through the emergence of technics). Stiegler’s thinking of technics therefore risks 
undermining an originary technicity that is not tied to the speciﬁc emergence of the human, which 
in a sense is what Derrida seems to be thinking under the rubric of the trace and différance as the 
‘history of life in general’.19 Arguably Stiegler therefore, according to Beardsworth’s reading in this 
later essay, ends up losing the true alterity in ‘technical alterity’ of the nonhuman which we have 
seen espoused in Derrida and the Political (since Stiegler’s technics is always thought as the 
prosthesis of the human). 
We should now consider here the second form of ‘radical alterity’ which Beardsworth outlines in 
Derrida and the Political, namely the ‘alterity of the promise’. In the opening of the conclusion to 
Derrida and the Political Beardsworth shows this Derridean thought of the promise at work in 
Specters of Marx. Beardsworth quotes the following passage: 
Even beyond the regulative idea in its classic form,20 the idea, if that is still what it is, of 
democracy to come, its ‘idea’ as event of pledged injunction that orders one to summon 
the very thing that will never present itself in the form of full presence, is the opening of 
this gap between an inﬁnite promise …and the determined, necessary, but also 
necessarily inadequate forms of what has to be measured against this promise. To this 
extent, the effectivity or actuality of the democratic promise, like that of the communist 
promise, will always keep within it, and it must do so, this absolutely undetermined 
messianic hope at its heart, this eschatological relation to the to-come [l’à-venir] of an 
19  The argument that Beardsworth makes here is similar to the one made by Bennington in his earlier essay 
‘Emergencies’, which may well have inﬂuenced Beardsworth’s thinking here. Bennington argues: ‘Stiegler wants to 
force the whole philosophical argumentation of Derrida through the ‘passage’ of the emergence of mankind: the fact 
that he then goes on to characterise that ‘passage’ in terms of an originary technicity which is very close to Derrida’s 
own thinking does not alter the fact that his ﬁrst gesture commits him to a certain positivism about difference, and 
this leads to his conﬁdent identiﬁcation of ‘technics’ as the name for a problem which he also recognises goes far 
beyond any traditional determination of that concept’ (“Emergencies” 190).
20  In a remarkable interview between Beardsworth and Derrida entitled ‘Nietzsche and the Machine’, Derrida provides 
the following extended analysis of why the ‘idea’ of ‘democracy to come’ is different from the Kantian Idea: 
‘Where the Idea in the Kantian sense leaves me dissatisﬁed is precisely around its principle of inﬁnity: ﬁrstly, it 
refers to an inﬁnite in the very place what I call différance implies the here and now, implies urgency and 
imminence …secondly, the Kantian Idea refers to an inﬁnity which constitutes a horizon. The horizon is, as the 
Greek word says, a limit forming a backdrop against which one can know, against which one can see what’s 
coming. The Idea has already anticipated the future before it arrives. So the idea is both too futural, in the sense that 
it is unable to think the deferral of difference in terms of ‘now’, and it is not ‘futural’ enough, in the sense that it 
already knows what tomorrow should be’ (“Nietzsche and the Machine: Interview with Jacques Derrida” 49–50).
event and of a singularity, of an alterity that cannot be anticipated. Awaiting without 
horizon of the wait, awaiting what one does not expect yet or any longer, hospitality 
without reserve, welcoming salutation accorded in advance to the absolute surprise of 
the arrivant from whom one will not ask anything in return …just opening which 
renounces any right to property, any right in general, messianic opening to what is 
coming, that is, to the event that cannot be awaited as such, or recognized in advance …
(Specters of Marx 65)
As is made clear here, Derrida is situating the political, in the form of the democratic or 
communist promise in terms of a ‘messianic’ structure of the event which Beardsworth calls the 
‘absolute future that informs all political organizations’ (Derrida and the Political 146). The 
thought of the political requires that one hold on to the idea of an indeterminate future, or an 
unanticipatable event. Without the ‘promise’ of such an unanticipatable event, no politics is 
possible: if the future were either in principle or practice entirely knowable then the political would 
become superﬂuous. The political must therefore welcome the event in its absolute alterity, 
awaiting it without horizon of anticipation (attente sans attente)—for to anticipate the event would 
already be in some sense to determine it, to know something about it, to anticipate the 
unanticipatable. This messianic structure around the event is to be distinguished by Derrida from 
any determinate messianism of a biblical kind: 
Ascesis strips the messianic hope of all biblical forms, and even all determinable ﬁgures 
of the wait or expectation …One may always take this the quasi-atheistic dryness of the 
messianic to be the condition of the religions of the Book, a desert that was not even 
theirs (but the earth is always borrowed, on loan from God, it is never possessed by the 
occupier, says precisely [justement] the Old Testament whose injunction one would also 
have to hear); one may always recognize there the arid soil in which grew, and passed 
away, the living ﬁgures of all the messiahs, whether they were announced, recognized 
or still awaited. (Specters of Marx 168)
However, this ‘dry’ messianic structure of the event is not simply a structure that would underpin 
any determinate messianism as it would underpin any determinate politics. Nor is it a limit that, as 
Derrida puts it in ‘Force of Law’, ‘deﬁnes either an inﬁnite progress or a waiting and awaiting’ 
(Acts of Religion 255). Because the political relationship to the ‘absolute future’ also requires that 
one act, that one make political decisions. This is an argument that Derrida formulates in relation to 
justice in the essay ‘Force of Law’: 
…justice, however unpresentable it remains, does not wait. It is that which must not 
wait. To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: a just decision is always required 
immediately, right away, as quickly as possible. It cannot provide itself with the inﬁnite 
information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions, rules or hypothetical 
imperatives that could justify it. And even if it did have all that at its disposal, even if it 
did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary knowledge about the matter, 
well then, the moment of decision as such, what must be just, must [il faut] always 
remain a ﬁnite moment of urgency and precipitation; it must [doit] not be the 
consequence or the effect of this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reﬂection or 
this deliberation, since the decision always marks the interruption of the juridico-, 
ethico-, or politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it, that must [doit] precede it. 
(Acts of Religion 255)
This messianic structure which Beardsworth associates with the promise and thinks of as 
Derrida’s second form of alterity is therefore marked by what Derrida calls later in Specters of  
Marx an ‘irreducible paradox’ (Specters of Marx 168). For it is both a ‘waiting without horizon of 
expectation’ and also ‘urgency, imminence’ (ibid.). One can never therefore be entirely happy with 
the division that Beardsworth makes at the end of Derrida and the Political when he associates this 
second form of alterity straightforwardly as ‘a reorganization of religious discourse’ (Derrida and 
the Political 156). It is never simply, for Derrida, the case that ‘what must be thought, articulated 
and witnessed is the passage of time’ (156). That is only one step, one side, or one hand and, as 
Beardsworth reminds us elsewhere, with Derrida ‘it is always a question of hands’ (“Deconstruction 
and Tradition” 287). For this reorganization of religious discourse is always also—via the thinking 
of urgency, imminence or the necessity of decision—a rethinking of political or juridical discourse. 
Nowhere could this point be clearer than in Specters of Marx, where Derrida very precisely 
associates the urgency or imminence of this messianic structure with Marxism. As Derrida puts it 
there: ‘No differance without alterity, no alterity without singularity, no singularity without here-
now’ (Specters of Marx 31). The linking of differance to the singularity of the here-now is an 
indication that, in a sense, what is being thought around the political injunction is not completely 
new in terms of Derrida’s thinking. Indeed in an earlier interview about Marx, Derrida explicitly 
links the singularity of the political injunction to the theme of iterability in ‘Signature Event 
Context’ (“The Politics of Friendship: an interview with Jacques Derrida” 228). This argument 
around iterability will help us to show that Derrida in fact from his earliest writing thinks 
Beardsworth’s two forms of alterity together. 
As Derrida reminds us in ‘Signature Event Context’: 
My “written communication” must, if you will, remain legible despite the absolute 
disappearance of every determined addressee in general for it to function as writing, that 
is, for it to be legible. It must be repeatable—iterable—in the absolute absence of the 
addressee or the empirically determinable set of addresses. This iterability (iter, once 
again, comes from itara, other in Sanskrit, and everything that follows may be read as 
the exploitation of the logic which links repetition to alterity), structures the mark of 
writing itself, and does so moreover for no matter what type of writing (pictographic, 
hieroglyphic, ideographic, phonetic, alphabetic, to use the old categories). (Margins of  
Philosophy 315)
The crucial phrase we need to underline here is that the iterability of the written mark constitutes 
a ‘logic which links repetition to alterity’. In his book On Being With Others Simon Glendinning 
gives a particularly clear account of this moment in Derrida: 
Paradoxical as it may seem, what has to be acknowledged here is that Derrida’s appeal 
here to the concept of iterability is made not only because of its connection with the idea 
of sameness and identity but also because of its (improbable, etymological) connection 
with alterity, otherness and difference. Roughly, what Derrida aims to show is that 
alterity and difference—i.e., what is traditionally conceived as bearing on features 
which are essentially ‘accidental’ or ‘external’ to ‘ideal identities’—are, in fact and in 
principle, a necessary and universal feature of all idealisation as such. Thus, Derrida 
will argue that the recognisability of the ‘same word’ is, in fact and in principle, 
possible only ‘in, through, and even in view of its alteration’. (Glendinning, On Being  
With Others 112; citing Derrida, Limited Inc 53)
In other words, what guarantees the sign in its identity, that is, its iterability, is already 
constituted through a relationship with alterity. Here this alterity is not simply that of original 
technicity, relation to exteriority, or the alterity of the ‘nonhuman’. It is always already also a 
relation to temporal alterity and alterity in general. Now this is clearly a very signiﬁcant point in 
relation to Stiegler’s attempt to develop the thought of originary technicity in Derrida’s early work 
on arche-writing into a general theory of technics. For Stiegler’s argument is, as we have seen, that 
the technical object in general constitutes the relationship to time, the condition of access to the 
undetermined future (and the privileged example of this is what he calls orthographic writing, what 
Derrida calls ‘phonetic’ writing). Yet the argument around iterability makes it clear that for Derrida 
the ‘orthographic’ mark is already itself constituted by a relation to alterity—the repeatable identity 
of the mark is only constituted through a relation to its temporal alteration and to alterity in general. 
There are in effect two sides to the argument around the trace. On the one hand, ‘articulating the 
living on the non-living in general’, the trace is a moment of exteriorisation, binding idealisation 
indissolubly to the mark (Of Grammatology 65). On the other hand (‘it is always a question of 
hands…’), the mark is never simply material: it is only constituted as the mark that it is through a 
relation with alterity, through an iterability that constitutes it, as Glendinning puts it above, ‘in, 
through, and even in view of its alteration’. Iterability can never mean simply ‘possibility of 
repetition’ because in that case what guaranteed the identity of the mark would have to be 
constituted as a possibility prior to the actual repetitions it made possible—this structure of an ideal 
form and its real copies would then reconstitute a logocentric and idealist understanding of 
language. The trace therefore can never simply constitute the technical possibility of a relationship 
to alterity, which it is already constituted itself through a relationship with alterity. The technical 
organisation of time is always already the temporal organisation of technics. 
The inextricable relationship between technicity and alterity in relation to the sign is in effect 
underlined in Derrida’s later work around the commodity. For Derrida, the spectral quality that 
Marx locates in exchange-value—that is, that an exterior thing be the bearer of an idealised value—
is already at work in use-value. For the use-value of the ordinary useful thing is never simply a 
material property, or constituted simply through an imminent relation of a human subject to the 
thing, but always, for Derrida through ‘[the] possibility of being used by the other or being used 
another time’ (Specters of Marx 162). As Derrida goes on, ‘In its originary iterability, a use-value is 
in advance promised, promised to exchange and beyond exchange.’ (Specters of Marx 162). What 
this makes clear once again is that for Derrida iterability, the identity of the technical object, or 
what Stiegler wants to think of as the organisation of ‘organised inorganic matter’ can’t simply be 
thought of as something that is constitutive of temporalisation because it is ﬁrst of all constituted by 
and through a relation to an alterity that is both spatial and temporal (here ﬁgured precisely in terms 
of the promise that Beardsworth would like to oppose to it). On the one hand this problematises the 
whole project of Technics and Time in as much at it wants to relate the history of the supplement—
thought of as the history of organized inorganic matter or technics—as the prosthesis which invents 
the human in its relationship to time. For the relationship to time cannot be simply derived from the 
technical object if, as Derrida’s argument around iterability makes clear, the technical object is 
already constituted in part by that relationship with time. On the other hand it also renders 
extremely problematic the division Beardsworth is trying to demonstrate in his conclusion to 
Derrida and the Political between two forms of alterity. To recall the terms of Beardsworth’s 
argument: 
…in the context of the theme of originary technicity of man …there is indeed a shift 
which Derrida has not expounded. In Of Grammatology the trace was said to ‘connect 
with the same possibility …the structure of relationship to the other, the movement of 
temporalization, and language as writing’ …In ‘The violence of the letter: from Lévi-
Strauss to Rousseau’ Derrida maintained that ‘arche-writing’ was the origin of morality 
as of immorality. The non-ethical opening of ethics. A violent opening’. This opening is 
rewritten as the promise in Specters of Marx. And yet, if time is from the ﬁrst 
technically organized, if access to the experience of time is only possible through 
technics, then the ‘promise’ must be more originary than ‘originary technicity’. Even if 
they are inseparable—and what else is the law of contamination but this inextricability?
—they are not on the same ‘ontological’ level. There are, consequently, ‘two’ instances 
of ‘radical alterity’ here which need articulation and whose relation demands to be 
developed: the radical alterity of the promise and the radical alterity of the other prior to 
the ego of which one modality (and increasingly so in the coming years) is the technical 
other. (Derrida and the Political 155)
In the context of what we have just discussed it becomes clear what the problem here is for 
Beardsworth. For he wants to regard Derrida’s early work as concerned with an originary technicity 
in the form of the trace that would be constitutive of both temporalization and the relationship to the 
other, and therefore constitute the ‘nonethical opening of ethics’. The priority here would be not to 
think alterity but rather to think that which is constitutive of alterity, i.e., the ‘technical other’, 
exteriority and the relation to the nonhuman, in short ‘technics’. But then with the thinking of the 
‘promise’ in Specters of Marx it begins to seem as if the alterity that appeared to be constituted by 
technics in the early work is in fact more originary than technics. The relation to temporal alterity in 
the form of the event would have to be thought prior to the technical ‘organization’ of time. This 
leads Beardsworth to conclude that there must indeed be two forms of alterity at work in Derrida, 
‘which need articulation and whose relation demands to be developed’. 
But the analysis we have just made makes it clear that in Derrida’s analysis of writing the 
‘technicity’ of the sign, i.e. iterability, is already constituted through a relation to the other. It is not 
a question of simply constituting or making possible a relation to temporal alterity. The problem 
here is Beardsworth’s ‘And yet, if time is from the ﬁrst technically organized …’. For that implies 
that technical organization is to be thought prior to the temporalisation that it gives access to. 
(Indeed this sounds much more like Stiegler than Derrida.) As Derrida puts it in Of Grammatology, 
i.e., the very text that Beardsworth is quoting from: 
The “unmotivatedness” of the sign requires a synthesis in which the absolutely other is 
announced as such—without any simplicity, any identity, any resemblance or continuity
—within what is not it …The trace, where the relationship with the other is marked, 
articulates its possibility in the entire ﬁeld of the entity [étant] …(Of Grammatology 47, 
translation slightly modiﬁed).
The relation to the other is not constituted by some, technical, for example, ‘synthesis’ that 
precedes it: alterity is rather already inscribed within the synthesis that constitutes the trace. 
Originary technicity in the form of the trace is here quite clearly the opening to alterity, to the 
‘event’, to the ‘promise’ which Beardsworth thinks must come along later and therefore constitute 
‘a shift which Derrida has not expounded’. But there is no shift in Derrida here that has not been 
expounded. If there is a shift to be ‘expounded’ it is between Derrida’s understanding of originary 
technicity in the trace and Stiegler’s thinking of technics as the technical organisation or 
determination of time. 
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